Although some good results were achieved in speeding up the computation of pairing function in recent years, it is still interesting to design efficient cryptosystems with less bilinear pairing operation. A proxy signature scheme allows a proxy signer to sign messages on behalf of an original signer within a given context. We propose a certificateless proxy signature (CLPS) scheme from RSA and prove its security under the strongest security model where the Type I/II adversary is a super Type I/II adversary.
Introduction
Public key cryptography is an important technique to realize network and information security. Traditional public key infrastructure requires a trusted certification authority to issue a certificate binding the identity and the public key of an entity. Hence, the problem of certificate management arises. To solve the problem, Shamir defined a new public key paradigm called identity-based public key cryptography [1] . However, identity-based public key cryptography needs a trusted PKG to generate a private key for an entity according to its identity. So we are confronted with the key escrow problem. Fortunately, the two problems in traditional public key infrastructure and identity-based public key cryptography can be prohibited by introducing certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) [2] , which can be conceived as an intermediate between traditional public key infrastructure and identity-based cryptography.
Certificateless Cryptography. In 2003, Al-Riyami and
Paterson [2] introduced the notion of certificateless public key cryptography. Its goal is to remove the key escrow property from identity-based cryptography and has attracted a great extent of attention lately [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Certificateless cryptography not only eliminates the key escrow property but also removes certificates. It lets a semitrusted KGC issue a user partial key to a user with respect to his/her identity. By possessing both the user partial key and a self-generated user secret key, the user is able to carry out predefined cryptographic operations. Typically there are two types of attacks to consider in certificateless cryptography. One is called KGC Attack in which the KGC is malicious and targets forge signatures from its knowledge about the user's partial key. The other one is called Key Replacement Attack in which the user's public/secret key pair could be replaced by a third party but this user's partial key issued by the KGC is not revealed. Au et al. [12] further investigated the types of malicious activities that the semitrusted KGC may be allowed to perform in practice and proposed a new strong security model called Malicious-but-Passive KGC Attack to replace original KGC Attack. A Malicious-but-Passive KGC may generate system parameters and the master key pair without following the scheme specification. Several certificateless signature schemes have been found vulnerable to this attack.
Cryptography from RSA.
In 1985, Shamir [1] proposed the first identity-based signature scheme from the RSA primitive. In 1990, Guillou and Quisquater [13] proposed a similar RSA identity-based signature scheme, which is constructed from a zero-knowledge identification protocol. Herranz [14] proposed identity-based ring signatures from RSA whose security is based on the hardness of the RSA problem. After initial schemes, the following breakthrough result in the area of identity-based cryptography came in 2003, when Boneh and Franklin [15] designed an efficient identity-based public key encryption scheme. In the design, they used as a tool bilinear pairings, a kind of maps which can be constructed on some elliptic curves. Since the appearance of this work, a lot of cryptography schemes have been proposed for encryption, signature, key agreement, and so forth and they all employ such bilinear pairings. However, it is still desirable to find cryptography schemes which do not need to employ bilinear pairings.
Proxy
Signature. The concept of proxy signatures was first introduced by Mambo et al. [16] . Based on the delegation type, they classified proxy signature schemes into three types: full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant. In a full delegation scheme, the original signer's private key is given to the proxy signer. Hence, the proxy signer has the same signing right as the original signer. Obviously, such schemes are impractical and insecure for most of realworld settings. In a partial delegation scheme, a proxy signer has a new key, called proxy private key, which is different from the original's private key. Although proxy signatures generated by using proxy private key are different from the original signers standard signatures, the proxy signer is not limited on the range of messages he can sign. This weakness is eliminated in delegation by warrant schemes. One of the main advantages of the use of warrants is that it is possible to include any type of security policy (that specifies what kinds of messages are delegated and may contain other information, such as the identities of the original signer, the proxy signer, the delegation period, etc.) in the warrant to describe the restrictions under which the delegation is valid. Therefore, proxy signature scheme which uses the method of this approach attracts a great interest, and it is often expected that new proxy signature schemes will implement the functionality of warrants.
In order to adapt different situations, many proxy signature variants are produced, such as one-time proxy signature, proxy blind signature, and multiproxy signature. Since the proxy signature appears, it attracts many researchers' great attention. Using bilinear pairings, people proposed many new ID-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] and certificateless proxy signature (CLPS) [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] schemes. All the above schemes are very practical, but they are based on bilinear pairings and the pairing is regarded as the most expensive cryptography primitive. The relative computation cost of a pairing is much higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group. Therefore, CLPS scheme without less bilinear pairing operations would be more appealing in terms of efficiency.
Motivations and Our Contributions.
Although some good results were achieved in speeding up the computation of pairing function in recent years, it is still interesting to design cryptographic scheme without pairing operations.
In this paper, we propose a certificateless proxy signature (CLPS) scheme, which has the following features.
(i) The proposed scheme is security under the strongest security model. Namely, in the scheme, the super Type I/II adversary can obtain the valid signatures for the replaced public key, without additional submission.
(ii) The proposed scheme not only enjoys a high security level but is also very efficient. The scheme does not need pairing operation. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme is the first certificateless proxy signature scheme from RSA.
Preliminaries
Definition 1. Let = , where and are two -bit prime numbers. Let be a random prime number, greater than 2 for some fixed parameter , such that gcd( , ( )) = 1. Let be a random element in * . We say that an algorithm C solves the RSA problem if it receives as input the tuple ( , , ) and outputs an element such that = mod .
Definition 2. Given a generator of a group of prime order , and an element ∈ , the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is to compute .
Model of Certificateless Proxy Signature Scheme.
A certificateless proxy signature scheme consists of the following eight algorithms: setup, partial private key extraction, secret value setting, user public key generation, delegate, delegation verify, proxy sign, and proxy signature verify:
(i) Setup. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter and returns params (system parameters) and a randomly chosen master secret key msk. After the algorithm is performed, the KGC publishes the system parameters params and keeps the master key msk secret.
(ii) Partial Private Key Extract. This algorithm takes as input params, msk, and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * of an entity and returns a partial private key ID . The KGC carries out the algorithm to generate the partial private key ID and sends ID to the corresponding owner ID via a secure channel.
(iii) Secret Value Set. This algorithm takes the params, an identity ID, as input and outputs a secret value ID . This algorithm is run by the identity ID for itself.
(iv) User Public Key Generate. This algorithm takes the params, an identity ID and the identity's secret value ID as input. It outputs the public key PK ID for the identity ID. This algorithm is run by the identity ID for itself.
(v) Delegate. This algorithm takes as input the params, original signer's full private key ( , ), a warrant , and outputs the delegation .
(vi) Delegation Verify. This algorithm takes as input params, , and verifies whether is a valid delegation from the original signer.
(vii) Proxy Sign. This algorithm takes as input the params, proxy signer's full private key ( , ), delegation , a message , and outputs the proxy signature .
(viii) Proxy Signature Verify. This algorithm takes as input the params, original signer's identity/public key ID /PK , proxy signer's identity/public key ID /PK , a proxy signature , and outputs 1 if the proxy signature is valid or 0 otherwise.
Definition 3.
A certificateless proxy signature scheme (CLPS) is said to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CLPS-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a nonnegligible advantage in the following two games against Type I and Type II adversaries.
Game I. Now we illustrate the first game performed between a challenger C and a Type I adversary A for a certificateless proxy signature scheme.
Initialization. C runs the setup algorithm to generate a master secret key msk and the public system parameters params. C keeps msk secret and gives params to A . We should bear in mind that A does not know msk.
Queries.
A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries. These queries may be made adaptively; that is, each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
(i) Create user: on inputting an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , if ID has already been created, nothing is to be carried out. Otherwise, C runs the algorithms partial private key extract, secret value set, and user public key generate to obtain the partial private key ID , secret value ID , and public key PK ID . In this case, ID is said to be created and PK ID is returned.
(ii) Partial private key extract: on inputting an identity ID, it returns the partial private key ID if ID has been created. Otherwise, returns 0.
(iii) Public key replace: on inputting an identity ID and a user public key PK ID , the original user public key of ID is replaced with PK ID if ID has been created. Otherwise, no action will be taken.
(iv) Secret value set: on inputting an identity ID, it returns the corresponding user secret key ID if ID has been created. Otherwise, returns 0. Note that ID is the secret value associated with the original public key PK ID . A cannot query the secret value for ID whose public key has been replaced.
(v) Delegate: when A submits original signer's identity/public key ID / and a warrant to the challenger, C responds by running the delegate algorithm on the warrant and the original signer's full private key ( , ).
(vi) Proxy sign: when A submits a delegation and a message to the challenger, C responds by running the proxy sign algorithm on the delegation , message , and the proxy signer's full private key ( , ).
Forge. A outputs a tuple
A wins the game, if one of the following cases is satisfied:
The final output is ( * , ID , PK ) and it satisfies (1) * is a valid delegation.
(2) * is not generated from the delegation query on (ID , PK ). (3) A does not query the original signer ID 's partial private key. (4) A cannot query the secret value for any identity if the corresponding public key has already been replaced.
(ii) Case 2: The final output is ( * , * , * , ID , PK , ID , PK ) and it satisfies (1) * is a valid proxy signature.
(2) * is not generated from the proxy signature query. (iii) Case 3: The final output is ( * , * , * , ID , PK , ID , PK ) and it satisfies (1) * is a valid proxy signature.
(2) * is not generated from the proxy signature query. (3) A does not query the proxy signer ID 's partial private key. (4) A cannot query the secret value for any identity if the corresponding public key has already been replaced.
The advantage of A is defined as Adv
Game II. A Type II adversary A plays the second game with a challenger C as follows.
Initialization. C runs the setup algorithm to obtain a master secret key msk and public system parameters params. C gives params and msk to A . We should bear in mind that A know msk.
Queries.
A may adaptively make a polynomially bounded number of queries as in Game I.
Forge. A outputs a tuple
( * , ID , PK ) or ( * , * , * , ID , PK , ID , PK ) .(2)
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
A wins the game, if one of the following cases is satisfied (i) Case 1: The final output is ( * , ID , PK ) and it satisfies (1) * is a valid delegation.
(2) * is not generated from the delegation query on (ID , PK ). (ii) Case 2: The final output is ( * , * , * , ID , PK , ID , PK ) and it satisfies (1) * is a valid proxy signature.
(2) * is not generated from the proxy signature query. 
Our Certificateless Proxy Signature Scheme
(i) Setup: given the security parameter of the system , the KGC generates two random -bit prime numbers and . Then it computes = . For some fixed parameter (for example = 160), it chooses at random a prime number satisfying 2 < < 2
+1
and gcd( , ( )) = 1. Then it chooses group of prime order , a generator of , and computes = −1 mod ( ). Furthermore, KGC chooses five cryptographic hash functions described as follows:
Finally, KGC outputs the set of public parameters: params = { , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 }; the master secret key is ( , , ).
(ii) Partial private key extract: for an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * his private key is ID = ID , ID = 0 (ID). The KGC sends ID to the user ID via a secure channel.
(iii) Set secret value: the user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * randomly chooses ID ∈ * .
(iv) User public key generation: the user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * computes his public key ID = ID . (v) Delegate:
is the warrant consisting of the identities/public keys of original signer and proxy signer, the delegation duration, and so on. On inputting the warrant , the original signer, whose identity/public key is ID / , performs the following steps.
(vi) Randomly selects ∈ * , ∈ * , computes 1 = ,
(viii) Outputs = ( , 1 , 2 , , ) as the delegation.
(ix) Delegation verify: to verify a delegation = ( , 1 , 2 , , ) for an identity/public key ID / , the verifier performs the following steps.
Checking whether = 1 ℎ 1 , = 2 ℎ 2 mod , if both of equalities hold, accept the delegation. Otherwise, reject.
(x) Proxy sign: for a message , the proxy signer (whose identity/public key is ID / ) who owns the delegation = ( , 1 , 2 , , ) does the following.
(1) Randomly selects ∈ * , ∈ * , computes
(xi) Proxy signature verify: to verify the validity of a proxy signature (where the original singer's identity/public key is ID / , the proxy singer's identity/public key is ID / ), a verifier first checks whether the original signer and proxy signer conform to and then performs the following steps. (xii) On correctness, we have Proof. Suppose the challenger C receives a random instance ( , , ) of the RSA problem and has to find an element ∈ * such that = . C will run A as a subroutine and act as A 's challenger in the EUF-CLPS-CMA game I.
Security Results of Scheme 1
Setup. At the beginning of the game, C runs the setup program with the parameter and gives A the system parameters: params = { , , , , 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 }.
Queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the queries are distinct and A will make 0 query and create user query for ID before ID is used in any other queries.
(i) 0 queries: C maintains the list 0 of tuple (ID , ).
The list is initially empty. When A makes a query 0 (ID ), C responds as follows.
At the th 0 query, C sets 0 (ID * ) = . For ̸ = , C randomly picks a value ∈ * and sets (iv) 3 queries: C maintains the list 3 of tuple ( , ).
The list is initially empty. When A makes a query 3 ( ), C randomly picks a value ∈ * and sets 3 ( ) = ; the query and the answer will then be stored in the list 3 .
(v) 4 queries: C maintains the list 4 of tuple ( , ).
The list is initially empty. When A makes a query 4 ( ), C randomly picks a value ∈ * and sets 4 ( ) = ; the query and the answer will then be stored in the list 4 .
(vi) Create user queries: C maintains the list of tuple (ID , , , ) . A makes creating user query for identity ID and C first makes query 0 (ID ) and gets (ID , ) from list 0 , then randomly chooses ∈ * , sets = . If ID = ID * , C sets = 0, otherwise sets = . Then it sends the to A ; the (ID , , , ) will be stored in the list . (viii) User public key replace: C maintains the list of tuple (ID , , ). A makes user public key replacement request for identity ID with a new valid public key value . C replaces the current public key value with the value and tuple (ID , , ) will be stored in the list .
(ix) Set secret value: C maintains the list of tuple (ID , ). A makes setting secret value query for identity ID . C finds the tuple (ID , , , ) in list and responds with the secret value ; the (ID , ) will be stored in the list . (Note: A cannot query the secret value for ID whose public key has been replaced.) (x) Delegate: A submits ID / , ID / , and to challenger. C outputs a delegation as follows.
If ID ̸ = ID * and ID ∉ , C gives a delegation by calling the delegate algorithm. Otherwise, C does as follows.
(1) Randomly selects ∈ * and , ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 ∈ * . (xi) Proxy sign: A submits a delegation = ( , 1 , 2 , , ) message to the challenger. C outputs a certificateless proxy signature as follows (where original signer's identity/public key is ID / , proxy signer's identity/public key is ID / ). Forge. A outputs a tuple
If A 's output satisfies none of the three cases in EUF-CLPS-CMA game I, C aborts; Otherwise, C can solve the RSA problem as follows.
Case 1.
The final output is { * = ( , 1 , 2 , , ) , ID , } and the output satisfies the requirement of Case 1 as defined in EUF-CLPS-CMA game I. In fact, * is the signature for by ID . By the forking lemma for generic signature scheme, for the resemble construction we can get two delegations: ( , 1 , 2 , , ) and ( , 1 , 2 , , ) , where
and ℎ 2 ̸ = ℎ 2 . If ID = ID * , we can solve RSA problem as follows. The relation becomes ( −1 ) = ℎ 2 −ℎ 2 mod . Since ℎ 2 , ℎ 2 ∈ , we have that |ℎ 2 − ℎ 2 | < . By the element is a prime number. So gcd( , ℎ 2 − ℎ 2 ) = 1. This means that there exist two integers and such that + (ℎ 2 − ℎ 2 ) = 1. Finally, the value = ( −1 ) mod is the solution of the given instance of the RSA problem. In effect, we have = (
Probability of Success. The probability that C does not fail during the queries is (
. The probability that ID = ID * is 1/( 0 − ). So the combined probability is
. Therefore, the probability of C to solve the RSA problem is / 0 . Case 2. The final output is { * = ( , , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , , ), ID , , ID , } and the output satisfies the requirement of Case 2 as defined in EUF-IBPS-CMA game I. By the forking lemma for generic signature scheme, for the resemble construction we can get two proxy signatures: ( , , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , , ) and ( , , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , , ), where
If ID = ID * , we can solve RSA problem as follows. The
, we have that |ℎ 2 − ℎ 2 | < . By the element is a prime number. So it holds gcd( , ℎ 2 − ℎ 2 ) = 1. This means that there exist two integers and such that + (ℎ 2 −ℎ 2 ) = 1. Finally, the value = ( −1 ) mod is the solution of the given instance of the RSA problem. In effect, we have
Probability of success is the same as the probability in Case 1.
, ID , , ID , } and the output satisfies the requirement of Case 3 as defined in EUF-IBPS-CMA game I. By the forking lemma for generic signature scheme, for the resemble construction we can get two proxy signatures:
, where
If ID = ID * , we can solve RSA problem as follows. The relation becomes (
, we have that | 2 − 2 | < . By the element is a prime number. So it holds gcd( , 2 − 2 ) = 1. This means that there exist two integers and such that + ( 2 − 2 ) = 1. Finally, the value = ( −1 ) mod is the solution of the given instance of the RSA problem. In effect, we have
Probability of success is the same as the probability in Case 1. Proof. Suppose the challenger C receives a random instance ( , ) of the DLP and has to compute the value of . C will run A as a subroutine and act as A 's challenger in the EUF-CLPS-CMA game II.
Setup. At the beginning of the game, C runs the setup program with the parameter and gives A the system parameters: params = { , , , , 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 } and master secret key ( , , ).
Queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the queries are distinct and A will make 0 query and create user query for ID before ID is used in any other queries. At the th create user query, C first makes query 0 (ID * ), gets (ID * , ID * ) from list 0 , sets ID * = ID * and ID * = . ̸ = , C first makes query 0 (ID ), gets (ID , ) from list 0 , sets = , then, randomly chooses ∈ * , sets = , then sends to the A ; the query and the answer will be stored in the list .
(iv) Partial private key extract: Since A knows master secret key ( , , ), he can compute partial private key for any identity by himself. Hence, C does not need making partial private key query. (v) User public key replace: C maintains the list of tuple (ID , , ). A makes user public key replacement request for identity ID with a new valid public key value . C replaces the current public key value with the value and tuple (ID , , ) will be stored in the list . (vi) Set secret value: C maintains the list of tuple (ID , ). A makes partial private key query for identity ID . If ID = ID * , C fails and stops. Otherwise, C finds the tuple (ID , , , ) in list and responds with the secret value ; the (ID , ) will be stored in the list . (Note: A cannot query the secret value for ID whose public key has been replaced.) (vii) Delegate and proxy sign: Same as that in the proof of Theorem 4.
Forge. A outputs a tuple
If A 's output satisfies none of the three cases in EUF-CLPS-CMA game II, C aborts; otherwise, C can solve the DLP in as follows.
Case 1. The final output is { * = ( , 1 , 2 , , ) , ID , } and the output satisfies the requirement of Case 1 as defined in EUF-CLPS-CMA game II. In fact, * is the signature for by ID . By the forking lemma for generic signature scheme, for the resemble construction we can get two delegations: ( , 1 , 2 , , ) and ( , 1 , 2 , , ) , where
If ID = ID * , we can solve DLP as follows:
Probability of Success. The probability that C does not fail during the queries is ( − )/ . The probability that ID = ID * is 1/( − ). So the combined probability is (( − )/ ) ⋅ (1/( − )) = 1/ . Therefore, the probability of C to solve the DLP is / .
Case 2. The final output is { * = ( , , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , , ), ID , , ID , } and the output satisfies the requirement of Case 2 as defined in EUF-CLPS-CMA game II. By the forking lemma for generic signature scheme, for the resemble construction we can get two proxy signatures:
If ID = ID * , we can solve DLP as follows: = ( − )(ℎ 1 − ℎ 1 ) −1 mod . Probability of success is same as the probability in Case 1. 
If ID = ID * , we can solve DLP as follows: = ( − )( 1 − 1 ) −1 mod . Probability of success is same as the probability in Case 1.
Efficiency
Although some good results were achieved in speeding up the computation of pairing function in recent years, it is still desirable to find cryptography schemes which do not need to employ bilinear pairings. In this section, we compare the performance of our scheme with several CLPS schemes in Table 2 ; we define some notations as follows.
: a pairing operation.
a pairing-based scalar multiplication operation.
: a scalar multiplication operation.
: modular exponent in .
Cao et al. [39] obtained the running time for cryptographic operations through a PIV 3 GHZ processor with 512 M bytes memory and the Windows XP operating system. For the pairing-based scheme, to achieve the 1024-bit RSA level security, a supersingular curve over a finite field , with = 512 bits and a large prime order = 160 bits, was used. For the ECC-based schemes, to achieve the same security level, the ECC group on Koblitz elliptic curve 2 = 3 + 2 + was used which is defined on 2 163 with = 1 and is a 163-bit random prime. The running times are listed in Table 1 .
To evaluate the computation efficiency of different schemes, we use the simple method from [39] . For example, in Li et al. [35] scheme, eleven pairing operations and seven pairing-based scalar multiplication operation are needed. So the resulting computation time is 20.01 × 11 + 6.38 × 7 = 265.87. The detailed comparison results of several different CLPS schemes are illustrated in Table 2 .
Conclusion
We proposed a certificateless proxy signature scheme and prove that our scheme is unforgeable under the strongest security model where the Type I/II adversary is a super Type I/II adversary. The analysis shows our scheme is more efficient than the related schemes. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme is the first certificateless proxy signature scheme from RSA. Due to the good properties of our schemes, it is very useful for practical application.
